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IntroductIon
Egypt’s revolution did not end on February 11, 2011. Despite the removal of Hosni Mubarak from the presi-dency, the former Mubarak regime remains entrenched 
in Egypt’s economic and political system.1 This is evident from 
the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces’ (SCAF) June 2012 
power grab of legislative authority after dissolving parliament 
— a move many consider to have been a virtual military coup 
d’etat.2 Skeptics argue SCAF is merely a Mubarak holdover 
until the old regime can reinvent itself under a new guise. 
Former Prime Minister and Mubarak confidant Ahmed Shafiq’s 
near win against the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohammed Morsi 
in the presidential elections may be proof of this.3 A Shafiq 
presidency would have instantly nullified gains made through 
the last eighteen months of pro-
tests, sacrifices, and deaths by 
millions of Egyptians.
But today, even with a Morsi 
victory, one is hard-pressed 
to find significant changes to 
Egypt’s political landscape. From 
the military-run executive branch 
to senior officials in the national 
security regime, Mubarak’s men 
still call the shots. Senior judi-
cial appointments to Egypt’s high 
courts are suspected of rulings 
that are inappropriately lenient 
toward former cabinet members.4 
And despite a legitimate parlia-
mentary election process, the military seized back legislative 
authority after the Supreme Constitutional Court dissolved par-
liament. Meanwhile, legal challenges to the military’s flagrant 
power grab are quickly dismissed by a judiciary that is increas-
ingly perceived as partial to the military.5
The now-dissolved parliament — dominated by the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party and the Salafi’s Nour 
party6 — once served as the sole bulwark against other sections 
of the military-controlled government. But it proved to be a 
rambunctious, disheveled, and ineffective bunch, and the few 
bills it managed to pass could not become law without SCAF’s 
approval.7 Even if a bill became law, implementation was an 
enormous hurdle because enforcement has always been a major 
impediment to establishing rule of law in Egypt. So long as 
holdover Mubarak officials controlled the bureaucracy and secu-
rity forces, the few reform laws promulgated were as valueless 
as the paper on which they were written.
Although the current political landscape differs from the days 
preceding the January 25 revolution, Egypt appears to suffer 
from a familiar syndrome: for every step taken towards mean-
ingful reform, it falls back two steps due to entrenched counter-
revolutionary forces. This began the moment the military took 
control of the executive branch on February 11, 2011 only to 
unilaterally replace the 1971 constitution with its own interim 
Constitutional Declaration on March 30, 2011.8 This dubious 
document unilaterally imposed 
by SCAF barely holds Egypt 
together as the country faces one 
legal crisis after another.
Even when parliament 
existed, the Constitutional 
Declaration did not clarify par-
liament’s governing authority 
viz-a-viz the executive branch. 
Article 141 of the provisional 
constitution grants the President 
the power to appoint the Prime 
Minister from within the ranks 
of the political party holding 
the most parliamentary seats. 
However, this article also allows the President to sack the 
Prime Minister from office without parliament’s approval. 
Article 76 of the Interim Constitutional Declaration does not 
permit appeals of rulings by the presidential elections commis-
sion on election disputes, jeopardizing the legitimacy of the 
presidential elections as those alleging fraud and voting irregulari-
ties are denied a neutral and impartial review. Just as problematic 
is the SCAF’s removal of the 64-member parliamentary quota 
for women, thereby decreasing female representation in the 
People’s Assembly from twelve percent (64 members) to less 
than two percent (12 members, three of which were appointed by 
the SCAF).9 Finally, the same police and internal security forces 
that abused tens of thousands of Egyptians during the revolution 
remain intact eighteen months later.
These legal shortcomings, among others, contribute to a 
continued sense of instability among a majority of Egyptians. 
Ironically, it is the same instability initiated by remnants of 
the Mubarak regime that bootstraps them back into politi-
cal office. Former Prime Minister Ahmed Shafiq’s victory 
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3in the first round of the presidential elec-
tions was due to a populace disappointed in 
the revolutionaries who they deemed inca-
pable of delivering the goals of the revo-
lution — stability, dignity, and prosperity. 
Indeed, Shafiq’s campaign motto promised 
to bring back the stability that allegedly self-
indulgent and rabble-rousing revolutionar-
ies eliminated at the expense of ordinary 
Egyptians.10 In addition, Shafiq’s viability as a 
candidate was a result of the quick remobiliza-
tion of the National Democratic Party’s (NDP) 
leadership.11 The NDP had lay tactically dor-
mant in the first twelve months of the revolu-
tion only to later re-emerge and prove correct 
fears the Mubarak-era political apparatus is far 
from eliminated. Thus, whatever progress achieved by reformers 
since Mubarak’s overthrow is quickly being undermined by 
counter-revolutionaries and the military.
Against this political backdrop, this essay argues Egypt 
is still in the midst of a revolution and has yet to enter the 
post-revolutionary phase of nation-building. The essay starts 
by providing a brief summary of the political context of the 
post-Mubarak transition. Central to understanding the context is 
identifying the key political actors and their roles in the ongoing 
struggle to reshape Egypt’s political landscape. Finally, this 
essay highlights the importance of the rule of law to steer Egypt 
through an inevitably turbulent phase at this historic juncture. 
In many ways, the heated contestation for power is a healthy indi-
cator of Egyptians’ investment in their nation in stark contrast to 
the pre-revolution sense of hopeless complacency. But such con-
testations can be politically debilitating if they are not constrained 
by laws that ensure a fair and level playing field among the vari-
ous political actors, allow the citizenry to hold elected officials 
accountable for failing to improve the economy, and guarantee no 
one — not even a President, as evidenced by the recent criminal 
trial of Mubarak12 — is above the law. Without rule of law, how-
ever, the citizenry will again disengage from the political system 
as it discovers its votes and voices are irrelevant to the broader 
power struggle between the military and Muslim Brotherhood.
In perspective, Egypt’s experience could have turned out 
much worse compared to other nations undergoing revolutions 
(see: Syria). However, that alone does not curtail Egyptians’ well-
grounded demands of a government at the service of the people 
and not the other way around. Until leaders who are entirely 
separate from the former regime and its entrenched interests are 
elected, the people will not see the goals of the revolution realized.
The PosT-Mubarak PoliTical 
backdroP and key PoliTical acTors
Five pre-revolutionary factors have shaped 
the reality of Egypt’s current political turmoil. 
First, the Egyptian military has had de facto 
control of the executive and legislative branch 
since the army overthrew the British-backed 
King Farouk in 1952.13 Second, the Muslim 
Brotherhood, despite being officially banned, 
has gained popularity over the past few decades 
due to a general rise in religiosity and political 
Islam in the Middle East. Third, Saudi Arabia 
and other Gulf countries have actively sought to 
nudge Egypt out of its historic regional leader-
ship role. They have used significant investments 
in the Egyptian economy to leverage influence in 
Egyptian society through various means. The most obvious mani-
festation of these efforts is the growing Salafi movement in Egypt, 
which is notorious for adopting stringently literalist interpretations 
of the Quran. Fourth, the rate of poverty has risen at an alarming 
rate while a select cadre of Egyptians flaunts its corruptly acquired 
wealth.14 The rapidly increasing gap between the poor and the rich 
coupled with the near extinction of the middle class was a veritable 
powderkeg. Finally and often overlooked, is the deeply seated 
classism that dominates Egyptian culture. Higher-rung Egyptians’ 
elitist allergic reactions to lower socio-economic classes impede 
egalitarian reforms necessary for a vigorous democratic system. 
The liberal and revolutionaries’ failure to win votes in rural and 
urban poor electorates is a testament to this.15
The January 25 revolution was a significant blow to a deeply 
entrenched patronage system wherein the military monopolized 
power under a civilian guise of the National Democratic Party 
(NDP). Former military officials manipulated NDP leadership 
positions to curry the loyalty of the non-military business elite 
through corrupt land deals, heavily discounted raw materials, and 
valuable exclusive product distribution contracts. So long as the 
NDP was willing to line the business elite’s pockets, the latter was 
willing to cede political power to it. Thus, when the revolutionaries 
demanded the fall of the Mubarak regime, the interests of the oth-
erwise apolitical business elite were directly threatened, leading to 
a well-financed counter-revolution that continues to the present day.
Although a nominally civilian government controlled Egypt, 
every president since the 1952 overthrow of the British-backed 
King Farouk was a former military leader. In turn, those presi-
dents appointed trusted military colleagues to head key minis-
tries and public companies, ensuring firm military control over 
the country. As a result, the military manages a shadow economy 
that comprises approximately 40% of Egypt’s overall economy.16 
Much like in preceding administrations, the military under the 
Mubarak government ran a shadow economy free of taxes, 
duties, and accountability that rendered impossible any attempt 
to understand its operations, budgets, and profits. These hefty 
financial stakes explain much of the military’s intransigence in 
transferring control of domestic affairs to a civilian government.
But beyond its financial stakes, the military appears to genuinely 
hold a self-righteous savior persona developed during the revo-
lution. It believes tens of thousands of Egyptians would have 
been murdered had it not refused to defy the former President’s 
“… the military appears to 
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4order of shooting protestors. 
As such, the silencing of its 
guns has not silenced SCAF’s 
sanctimonious view of itself 
as the benevolent patriarch 
without whom the country 
would fall apart. However, 
its numerous missteps over 
the course of the last eigh-
teen months demonstrate its 
inability to govern a nation 
of 85 million people, 25 
percent of whom live at 
the poverty line at $44 per 
month and 5 percent living on less.17
Also worth noting is the Egyptian military’s strong ties to the 
United States military, from which it annually receives $1.3 bil-
lion in aid and training.18 In considering American interests, the 
worst outcome of the revolution is an Islamist-controlled Egypt 
that may not be as compliant with American prerogatives in the 
Middle East. For these reasons, among others, the military will 
continue to have significant influence in Egyptian politics.
Looming in the shadows is the Muslim Brotherhood’s for-
midable influence in the countryside and parts of Alexandria.19 
Despite being officially banned from politics for decades, the 
Brotherhood capitalized on the central government’s neglect of 
the rural areas and the urban poor by providing much needed 
social services.20 Its immediate success following the revolution, 
both in the streets and in parliament, appeared eerily calculated 
such that some Egyptians suspected the Brotherhood of orches-
trating the 2011 revolution. Indeed, the Brotherhood’s desire 
for political power was no secret. Despite being banned as a 
political party, it doggedly sought representation in the People’s 
Assembly by running its candidates in the limited seats allocated 
for independent candidates.21
To many city dwellers, the Muslim Brotherhood was too 
dogmatic for their sensibilities. Such perceptions were due 
in large part to Mubarak’s successful public defamation cam-
paigns portraying the Muslim Brotherhood as inflexible, 
religious zealots bent on forcibly transforming Egypt’s tolerant 
society into a Saudi-like theocracy. Known for their pious but 
moderate interpretations of Islam, Egyptians found the 
Brotherhood’s social 
agenda distasteful to their 
unique cultural combina-
tion of piety, tolerance, 
and humor.22 Thus, when 
it came time to vote in 
Egypt’s first free parlia-
mentary elections, many 
urban voters were con-
flicted between voting for 
an untested Islamist party 
and a directionless amal-
gamation of liberal revo-
lutionaries. In the end, the 
Brotherhood attained enough urban poor votes to supplement its 
popularity in the rural areas.
But the Muslim Brotherhood’s initial electoral success in the 
2011 parliamentary elections suffered a significant setback. Every 
promise of disinterest in dominating the legislative and executive 
branches was matched with a flagrant power grab. For instance, 
the Brotherhood initially proclaimed it would seek only thirty per-
cent of the now-defunct People’s Assembly. Yet, it ran for seventy 
percent of the seats and won fifty percent in the lower house of 
parliament.23 Combined with the twenty-five percent of seats Salafi 
candidates won — many of whom the Brotherhood endorsed — the 
lower house was firmly in the hands of Islamist parties. Similarly, 
the Brotherhood promised not to run a presidential candidate. But 
no sooner had it made the promise did it run two consecutive can-
didates — Khairat Al Shater who was disqualified and Mohammed 
Morsi who ultimately won.24 This duplicity significantly eroded the 
Brotherhood’s credibility such that it went from receiving fifty per-
cent of the votes in the parliamentary elections to only twenty-five 
percent in the first round of the presidential elections.
A significant mitigating force to the Brotherhood’s sudden rise 
to power and the counter-revolutionaries’ success is the matura-
tion of the Egyptian human rights community. Although a number 
of reputable human rights organizations date back to the 1990s, 
including the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR), 
Al Nadeem Center Against Torture, the Arab Network for Human 
Rights Information (ANHRI) and the Hisham Mubarak Center 
(HMC),25 the human rights community expanded and started 
coming of age in the early 2000s. Around that time, a number of 
highly effective organizations were founded that currently serve 
as staunch watchdogs over government abuse. For example, the 
Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR), founded in 2002, 
was the first to prioritize defending individual rights including 
the long-neglected Baha’i and gay communities.26 Two years 
later in 2004, the New Woman Foundation, which began as an 
informal study group, formalized its activities into an institution 
that incorporated gender rights issues into the broader democ-
racy movement taking root in Egypt.27 In 2006, the Association 
for Freedom of Thought and Expression (AFTE) was created to 
defend freedom of expression and combat state censorship of pub-
lic discourse and academia.28 Around the same time, the Egyptian 
Democracy Academy (EDA) was established to train youth in 
democracy promotion and grassroots activism.
But the growth of Egypt’s human rights community came at 
a heavy price. The Mubarak regime used every tool in its arsenal 
“But the growth of Egypt’s 
human rights community 
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5to destroy the human rights movement. Over the course of the 
past twenty years, thousands of activists have been arrested, 
detained, tortured, and prosecuted. An indefinite emergency 
anti-terrorism law authorized the government to deny detainees 
the most basic civil and human rights under the auspices of 
national security.29 The law’s loose definition of the term “ter-
rorism” gave the government room to surveil, torture, and hold 
in incommunicado detention even peaceful critics of the govern-
ment. The Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) registration 
law was manipulated to strip existing organizations of their 
registration, deny the application of new organizations, and deny 
them foreign funding.30 By placing activists outside the law, the 
government was more easily able to portray them as saboteurs 
to justify their harsh treatment. Mubarak also set up govern-
ment non-government organizations, referred to as GNGOs, to 
discredit independent organizations.31 The GNGOs produced 
purportedly independent research that legitimized government 
policies and depicted the Mubarak regime as a benevolent care-
taker of the country.
For unsuspecting Egyptians, the GNGOs’ reports corrobo-
rated conspiracy theories of malicious foreign meddling in 
Egyptian affairs through the nonprofit sector. The former regime 
successfully discredited human rights organizations as represen-
tative of elite Egyptians who were out of touch with the average 
Egyptian. By exploiting preexisting class grievances, Mubarak 
deterred many Egyptians from associating with organizations 
whose political reform agenda could have solved economic 
woes. Even if Egyptians willfully sought assistance from foreign 
NGOs, they could not do so freely. Under a watchful govern-
mental eye, they were legally required to first seek permission 
from the government to associate with NGOs or risk imprison-
ment.32 Furthermore, the former regime made the situation dif-
ficult for NGOs to operate, stalling registration applications for 
years, then interfering in their activities. The military continued 
this practice after Mubarak was removed from power.
Despite the military’s smear campaigns and fear tactics, the 
human rights community flourished.33 As more Egyptian youth 
became disaffected by the lack of employment, the deteriorat-
ing education system, and harsh policing tactics,34 calls for 
basic rights amplified. The maturation of Egypt’s human rights 
community from ideas to effectual institutions with budgets, 
staff, and strategic agendas responsive to legitimate economic 
and political grievances was a fundamental prerequisite for the 
revolution. For those reasons, any analysis of Egypt’s political 
environment must take into account the human rights commu-
nity’s role.
Gulf countries, Saudi Arabia in particular, are another set of 
actors attempting to influence the outcome of Egypt’s revolu-
tion. A telling illustration of the Gulf countries’ distress is their 
moniker of the Arab Spring as “the Crisis.”35 To the ruling 
monarchs of the Persian Gulf, the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, 
and Yemen set ominous threats to their own survival. Indeed, 
their first response to the uprisings was to double the salaries 
of all government employees in hopes of diffusing economic 
grievances.36 Because Egypt has historically lead the region in 
transformational political movements, as evinced by the spread 
of pan-Arab Nasserism in the 1950s and 1960s, Saudi Arabia 
does not want to see a successful secular, democratic state take 
root in Egypt. It would only be a matter of time before Saudi 
citizens seek to emulate their Egyptian counterparts, leaving 
the government unable to discredit demands for democracy as a 
seditious Western innovation.
Accordingly, Gulf countries have an interest in preventing 
the democratic aspirations underpinning Egypt’s revolution from 
coming to fruition. Saudi Arabia and Qatar poured millions of 
dollars into Islamist parties during elections and currently grant 
billions in foreign aid to secure their influence over Egypt’s 
political future.37 Not only does an Islamist state decrease the 
risk of a revolution in Saudi Arabia, but it also provides fertile 
ground to proselytize their literalist interpretations of Islam, 
which thus far has been rejected by the majority of Egyptians.
Certainly not to be dismissed is the role of the United States. 
America’s interest in keeping Egypt as an ally is no secret. As the 
most populous country in the Middle East with a shared border 
with Israel, America’s most valued ally, the United States will 
not stand by as its influence in Egypt wanes. Arguably, the U.S. 
government is adopting the same strategy as Saudi Arabia but 
for its support of liberal groups instead of Islamists. Hundreds 
of millions of dollars poured into liberal political groups and 
civil society organizations under the auspices of democracy 
promotion projects are suspected as aimed to offset any success 
of the Islamist parties — who are unlikely to be as compliant to 
American directives as the Mubarak regime.38
But the democracy development aid is paltry compared to 
the $1.3 billion paid to the Egyptian military in exchange for its 
support of American interests in the Middle 
East. The U.S.’s continuation of financial 
support to the military, notwithstanding its 
blatant human rights abuses in violation of 
Congressional conditions on aid, exposes 
America’s political hedging.39 While the 
military is the preferred domestic ally, the 
United States has had to come to terms 
with the reality that supporting dictators is 
not sustainable. No longer can tens of mil-
lions of Egyptians complacently live near or 
below the poverty rates while a select few 
unjustly enrich themselves by syphoning off 
state resources. Thus, the Obama adminis-
tration has made multiple overtures to work 
with the Muslim Brotherhood and its newly 
Egyptian women protesting. Photo courtesy of Egyptian American Rule of Law Association.
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6elected president despite heated domestic opposition. While a 
political realignment is inevitable in Egypt, the United States 
will continue to be a key player in Egyptian politics.
So Much haS changed, Yet Much ReMainS the SaMe
There is no doubt Egypt was forever changed on January 
25, 2011. The seal of fear deeply rooted in the Egyptian psyche 
was broken, releasing decades of pent-up deprivation. For those 
familiar with Egypt, witnessing millions of Egyptians taking to 
the streets, stridently demanding the fall of the regime was noth-
ing short of surreal. Although a revolution seemed imminent 
every year as economic conditions in Egypt rapidly deteriorated, 
Egyptians seemed cursed with a bottomless tolerance for suffer-
ing. Fortunately for the country’s future, the generation of youth 
whose futures had been sabotaged by a corrupt and tyrannical 
regime took the fateful steps into Tahrir (“Liberation”) Square.
For the first ten months of the revolution up until the new 
parliament took office, the military responded to the protesters 
in much the same way as its friend and former benefactor, 
Mubarak. It exercised broad authorities under emergency law, 
herded hundreds of protestors into military courts where they 
had no due process rights, tortured detainees by the thousands, 
and shut down nonprofit organizations that challenged its practices.40 
If any of those abusive tactics failed, it warned the people of a foreign-
born, invisible hand that prompted the protestors to create chaos.
In addition to these familiar tactics, the military desperately 
adopted even more aggressive tactics to offset its waning legiti-
macy. Women protesters became targets of assault and sexual 
harassment by the police and counter-revolutionaries.41 Military 
officers coercively performed virginity tests on female detainees, 
cognizant this form of torture is the most psychologically 
humiliating in a socially conservative Muslim country.42 This 
strong-armed control measure had the effect as well, to warn 
other women to stay home. When confronted on television about 
such practices, military officers dismissed their victims as loose 
women who “were not like our girls at home.”43 It was a mes-
sage to all fathers, husbands, and brothers to keep their women 
home lest they be corrupted by these promiscuous female 
protesters and ultimately be similarly treated when captured. 
More distressing is the fact women were sexually assaulted at a 
troubling rate. The reported cases were just the tip of the iceberg 
of the actual number of women who paid a heavy price for their 
attempts to oust the military regime. Ironically, while protesting 
the sexual assaults, women were accused of destabilizing the 
country and subsequently attacked by a mob of thugs.44 Public 
violence against women has become a wedge issue manipulated 
by the military to decrease the number of revolutionaries.
Still, eighteen months after the start of the revolution, much 
has changed in Egypt. For the first time in their lives, millions 
of Egyptians voted in parliamentary and presidential elections.45 
The importance of this lies not so much in the action of voting 
but rather Egyptians’ newfound trust in the relevance of their 
votes. In March 2011, Egyptians across socioeconomic lines 
actively debated whether they should draft a new constitution 
before or after electing a parliament. New voices that moderated 
lively debates among candidates quickly replaced television 
pundits puppeted by the Mubarak regime. Diverse viewpoints 
on various TV channels, newspapers, and opposition media sub-
sumed once dominant state-sponsored media. The consequent 
political energy has been palpable notwithstanding the bumpy 
transition process.
Another new development is the empowerment of Egyptian 
youth in an otherwise patriarchal system that once simply 
dismissed their grievances. Coined as the “revolutionary youth,” 
millions of young people of different political persuasions 
bucked tradition by refusing the older generation’s monopoly 
over political power. This assortment of economically diverse 
and politically inexperienced young people had worn the yoke 
of governmental oppression for far too long. In a combined 
front, they demanded justice, fairness, accountability, the rule 
of law, and political, civil, and human rights. Despite its leader-
less and seemingly rudderless revolutionary fervor, the group’s 
persistent return to Tahrir Square, the symbolic heart of the 
revolution, each time the military overreaches has transformed 
it into a potent political force. Magnifying its efficacy, the 
younger generation’s mastery of the latest social media technol-
ogy permits the group to quickly share information, monitor 
government wrongdoing, and mobilize back to “the Square” 
even after repeated expulsions. Tenacity appears to make up 
for the revolutionary youth’s small numbers compared to the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s large following and the former regime’s 
lurking counter-revolutionaries.
Not to be overlooked, despite existing risks to their lives and 
well-being, are the fearless revolutionary women who demand 
a transformational change in Egypt’s political system. Although 
the number of women who repeatedly protest in Tahrir is 
relatively small, a substantial percentage of women has gone 
to the streets at least once over the course of the last eighteen 
months. For a society that has traditionally demarcated politics 
to men because it was considered too dangerous or unbecoming 
“Coined as the “revolutionary youth,” millions  
of young people of different political persuasions  
bucked tradition by refusing the older generation’s  
monopoly over political power.”
100303_AU_HRB195.indd   6 9/25/12   8:42 AM
7for women, Egyptian women’s fiercely visible participation in 
each phase of the protracted revolution evinces a significant 
shift in gender relations. In addition, women in most households 
are actively debating the latest political issues irrespective of 
their participation in the protests.46 That said, Egyptian women 
have yet to attain their due access in ongoing political decision 
making bodies.
Despite all of these changes, much remains the same. 
The military continues Mubarak-era practices that violate 
human rights, but at a rate far surpassing Mubarak’s flagrant 
record. Under a cover of impunity afforded by the former 
regime’s emergency laws, the military has tried more than 
twelve thousand civilians47 in military courts where officers 
swiftly convicted and sentenced defendants to years in prison 
without providing due process rights.48 The military refused 
to repeal the emergency law after the revolution and kept 
pointing to ongoing protests to justify the law’s importance. 
It was not until June 4, 2012, during a heated presidential 
run-off election, the three decades-old law finally expired.49 
But in its place, other national security laws, some passed after 
the revolution, continue to authorize the military to engage in the 
same human rights violations under the color of law. As a result, 
thousands of protesters have been tortured by the military with 
no legal recourse. Well-known activists, such as Maikal Nabil 
Sanad and Asma Mahfouz, were prosecuted in military courts 
and sentenced to jail to set an example.50 Only after intense 
lobbying by American policy makers and internationally 
connected Egyptian advocates were the sentences overturned.
Other new laws were also unilaterally passed by the military 
to assume legislative and execu-
tive powers. Individuals were 
prosecuted for “insulting the 
army” as a direct affront to the 
freedom of speech and expres-
sion.51 Journalists were arrested 
for reporting on issues the army 
deemed defamatory.52 A notori-
ous “thuggery law” was passed 
under the auspices of returning 
law and order after a series of 
violent episodes between revo-
lutionaries and counter-revolu-
tionaries.53 By indicting revo-
lutionary youth for thuggery, 
the military publicly disparaged 
them as hooligans seeking to 
destabilize the country rather 
than liberate it. In the end, the 
thuggery law gave the military 
a tighter grip over the political 
situation and also allowed it to delegitimize protestors to mil-
lions of Egyptians sitting on their couches, watching television 
trying to make sense of the situation. Known as “hizb al kanaba” 
(figuratively The Couch Party), they represent the silent major-
ity whose opinions are swayed by daily events and whose num-
bers far outweigh those who regularly protest in Tahrir Square.54 
State media also portrayed the revolutionary youth and liberal 
leaning activists as saboteurs who created “fawda” or chaos — a 
state of affairs that’s anathema to stability-obsessed Egyptians. 
the more the public viewed revolutionaries as low-class thugs 
and troublemakers generating more instability, the more secure 
the military’s power. And because the military is an extension 
of the Mubarak regime, its retention of power renders 
the Egyptian revolution as an illegitimate coup de'état, not 
a grassroots revolution.
Anchoring DemocrAcy Through rule of lAw
A potent solution to the unpredictable and disorderly 
situation is for Egyptians to strengthen the rule of law.55 Notably, 
Egypt has one of the most sophisticated legal systems in the 
Middle East, borne of an amalgamation of Islamic, British, 
and French law.56 An aggravating effect of this complexity is 
the overwhelming caseloads burdening judges who work in an 
underfunded judicial administration system. An abundance of 
procedural delay mechanisms allows crafty lawyers to postpone 
resolution for decades.57 Litigants seeking to resolve their dis-
putes may find themselves in their deathbeds by the time their 
case makes its way through the convoluted appeals process. For 
these reasons and others, the Egyptian legal system fails to meet 
the needs of the business community and the citizenry at large.58
In addition to an increased investment in the judicial infra-
structure, technology, staff training, and other needs of an effective 
judicial system,59 a cultural shift must occur. Over the past sixty 
years, the law has been manipulated by the powerful to retain 
their power and enrich themselves at the expense of the aver-
age Egyptian. Rule by law, not rule of law, has been the norm 
in Egypt. Rule by law allows government officials to manipu-
late laws to concentrate and fur-
ther entrench their power while 
eliminating political opposition. 
In contrast, rule of law ensures 
no one is above the law, all citi-
zens are treated equally before 
the law, adjudicators of disputes 
are independent and objective, 
and legitimate grievances can be 
redressed without destabilizing 
mass protests.60
As a result, few Egyptians 
have faith in the Egyptian legal 
system.61 Such skepticism is 
most glaring in the numerous 
protests challenging rulings per-
ceived as too lenient, in cases 
against former Mubarak offi-
cials.62 Egyptians questioned 
the judges’ impartiality and con-
cluded the entire process was a farce. The distrust in the judicial 
and legal system was crystallized with the Supreme Constitutional 
Court’s recent dissolution of parliament — a move widely inter-
preted as a declawing of the Muslim Brotherhood’s majority 
control of parliament and an avenue through which the military 
assumed legislative powers.63 The Court’s move was also argu-
ably a political slap on the face to a parliament that was rumored 
to have debated eradi cating the Supreme Constitutional Court 
altogether64 or interfering in the promotion system of judges.65
“Despite all of these 
changes, much remains the 
same. The military continues 
Mubarak-era practices that 
violate human rights, but 
at a rate far surpassing 
Mubarak’s flagrant record.”
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8Court rulings finding unconstitutional the new law disqualifying 
former cabinet officials from political office, including Ahmed 
Shafiq, further delegitimized the courts.66 This credibility defi-
cit will not disappear overnight. It can only be reversed through 
a concerted effort to eliminate the rule by law mentality held 
by most politicians irrespective of their political affiliations. 
Just as integral to the transition to rule of law is the consistent 
and impartial enforcement of laws. In many instances, Egyptian 
laws comply with international law and best practices. However, 
if those laws conflict with the 
ruling party’s interests, then 
enforcement is nearly nonexistent. 
Thus, a legal reform agenda must 
focus on enforcement in addition 
to reforming substantive laws.
There is no shortage of laws 
in need of significant improve-
ment. In light of authoritarian 
abuses highlighted here, numer-
ous articles in the penal code 
must either be repealed alto-
gether or amended to narrow 
the circumstances in which a 
violation of law is found. For 
example, Article 184 of the Penal 
Code prohibits insulting the mili-
tary establishment or parliament 
and Article 102 prohibits spread-
ing false information. Articles 
179, 182, and 185 criminalize 
insulting the president, public 
officials, foreign heads of state, 
and foreign diplomats. Each of 
these provisions directly infringe 
on freedom of speech and expression, a fundamental attribute of 
a functioning democratic society. Such provisions are also most 
often too easily enforced to silence opposition. So long as these 
laws remain in effect, new political leaders whether or not they 
are affiliated with the former Mubarak regime, can abuse 
them to imprison the opposition.
Relatedly, laws that whisk citizens out of the criminal 
justice context and into a national security context, where 
due process rights are nonexistent, must be eliminated. 
Although Mubarak’s notorious emergency law expired on 
June 4, 2012, other laws grant prosecutors the authority to 
arbitrarily deem a defendant a threat to national security. For 
example, SCAF can still detain these defendants under the 
Code of Military Justice and try them in a military tribunal.67
One especially important law that needs to be passed is 
a freedom of information law. Much of Egypt’s unchecked 
corruption can be attributed to the absence of an effective legal 
mechanism for journalists, lawyers, and citizens to monitor 
government activities and ensure accountability.68 Over 
the past few decades alone, corrupt, greasy-palmed poli-
ticians have robbed the Egyptian treasury of billions of 
Egyptian pounds, only to be discovered years later, if at all, 
long after the money fleeted into foreign bank accounts.69 
All of this occurred under the blanket of secrecy afforded 
by the absence of transparency laws. Robust freedom of infor-
mation laws empower investigative journalists and watchdog 
groups to ferret out corruption in time to hold rule breakers 
responsible, serving as a powerful deterrent to future fraud. 
Because most Egyptians of all political stripes agree corruption 
is a pervasive problem,70 a freedom of information law is a polit-
ically palatable measure of reform that should be a priority in the 
new parliament’s agenda. Many other legal reforms, including 
free press and fair labor laws, are 
needed to transform Egypt into a 
prosperous nation that leverages 
its human capital and other 
national resources. In the end, 
a sustainable democracy can-
not exist without a solid rule of 
law foundation. 71
ConClusion
Egypt stands at a crossroads 
between merely replacing one set 
of corrupt leaders with another 
or completely transforming its 
political system to create a nation 
governed by and accountable to 
its citizens. While the revolution-
ary youth have clearly communi-
cated their demands for the latter, 
strong countervailing forces are 
using every tool in their arsenal 
to preserve the pre-revolution 
system. Significant conflicting 
financial and political interests 
are at stake, making Egypt’s rev-
olution an inevitably protracted process. Part of this painful but 
necessary process is a shift from a system of rule by law to rule of 
law. No one, no matter how powerful, rich, or influential should 
be above the law. And every elected official, no matter how high 
Revolutionary graffiti. Photo courtesy of Sahar Aziz. 
“Significant conflicting 
financial and political 
interests are at stake, 
making Egypt’s revolution 
an inevitably protracted 
process. Part of this painful 
but necessary process is a 
shift from a system of rule 
by law to rule of law.”
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9up, should be accountable to the electorate. Facts on the ground 
show this transformation does not occur without significant 
sacrifices both in terms of lives and livelihoods. But if the 
ultimate outcome is a more democratic, prosperous, and stable 
country, then the long wait is worthwhile. After centuries of 
authoritarianism by foreign occupiers, kings, and military rulers, 
Egyptians need and deserve to finally rule themselves.
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